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Abstract
This article develops a novel analytical framework for capturing the multiple, competing configurations that 
the migration-security nexus invokes in discourse and practice, combining insights from critical migration and 
security scholarship. The framework’s application is illustrated with an empirical case study of the protection 
and relocation of Afghan and Iraqi former local interpreters and other locally employed civilians working 
for Western armies. The analysis demonstrates that locally employed civilians (LECs) are simultaneously 
considered security actors in the East and security risks in the West, the ‘best and brightest’ causing brain 
drain and potential terrorists when crossing borders, both ‘model migrants’ and threats to western values. 
By uncovering the nexus’s multiple configurations and its contradictions, the framework supports the project 
of denaturalizing the migration-security nexus, while also showing that the discourses and practices justified 
through its various configurations include the legitimation of border violence and the denial of protection to 
migrants.
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Introduction
Dominant understandings of the migration-security nexus, which links ‘international migration, on 
the one hand, and human and state security, on the other hand’ (Faist, 2004: 4), posit that migration 
should be considered a security issue, following the assumption that the influx of migrants threat-
ens a host state or host society’s security. In response, scholars in critical migration and security 
studies have argued that the migration-security nexus is a political frame that justifies certain bor-
der policies and practices (Bigo, 2002; Faist, 2004; Huysmans and Squire, 2010). In their justified 
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interrogation of the hegemonic claim that migration constitutes a security risk to host countries, 
this work tends to limit its engagement with the migration-security nexus to the hegemonic con-
stellation of the nexus, which considers migration the primary driver for insecurity. However, as 
Stern and Öjendal have argued regarding another prominent nexus, the development-security 
nexus, a nexus invokes multiple meanings of security, as well as a wide variety of ‘possible link-
ages and relations’ between the two terms (2010: 11). Indeed, a kaleidoscope of configurations 
appears when recognizing that security can have various referent objects and that migration can be 
linked to both security and insecurity. Security and migration can each be considered the primary 
driver in the relation: country of origin insecurity can drive migration, but migration can generate 
insecurities for the migrant in the host country. In the same way that each rotation of a kaleidoscope 
reveals a new image, any change to each of these dimensions offers a different picture, while 
simultaneously obscuring other representations. However, unlike a kaleidoscope, which offers a 
beautiful pattern at every turn, the invocation of the migration-security nexus frequently justifies 
violence against migrants.
This article will argue that the already rich engagement between critical migration and security 
scholarship can be enhanced by building a systematic framework for charting the multiple configu-
rations that are contained in the migration-security nexus. This framework combines insights from 
security and migration studies, recognizing that ‘how the different established nexuses become 
differently imbued with meaning and ultimately employed needs further analysis’ (Sørensen, 2012: 
63). The framework will enable critical migration and security scholars to unpack the assumptions 
underlying the invocation of certain configurations of the nexus and also helps bring into focus 
alternative configurations and counter-discourses. It provides tools to recognize competing under-
standings of the nexus, identify contradictions and pin down shifts in the meaning of and relation 
between migration and security. Identifying counter-framings of the nexus offers a route for alter-
native perspectives to contest violent border and migration management practices carried out in the 
name of the migration-security nexus. I will illustrate the multiple and competing configurations 
of the nexus with the empirical case of the protection of Afghan and Iraqi former local interpreters 
and other locally employed civilians (LECs), such as cultural advisers and security guards. With 
their association with Western forces exposing them to targeted threats, they have sought protec-
tion through migration. I will expose contradictions and demonstrate the political stakes involved 
when strategically foregrounding certain configurations of the (in)security-migration nexus over 
others.
An analytical framework for the migration-security nexus
Nazli Choucri calls the migration-security nexus ‘particularly challenging and problematic because 
migration, security and the linkage between the two, are inherently subjective concepts [since] they 
are dependent on who is defining the terms and who benefits by defining the terms in a given way’ 
(2002: 97). In a similar vein, Didier Bigo argues that ‘the relation between security and migration 
is fully and immediately political. The wording is never innocent’ (2002: 71). I will use the insights 
of both critical migration and security scholarship as a springboard for developing a framework 
that captures the various possible configurations of the migration-security nexus in discourse, prac-
tice and analysis.
‘Migration’ is used to describe various phenomena, from labour migration to the flight of refu-
gees, from high-skilled to low-skilled migration and the associations attached to the distinctions 
between these phenomena are also not neutral but political. For instance, migration discourses in 
host countries tend to delineate categories of deserving from undeserving migrants in the context 
of a growing (problematic) political consensus that most asylum seekers are not genuine but 
‘bogus’, because they flee for ‘opportunistic’ economic reasons, with a minority of claimants being 
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considered ‘real’ refugees (Sales, 2002). In sending countries, migration may be positively associ-
ated with remittances, or negatively with brain drain (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). Migration schol-
ars have recognized that insecurity, such as conflict-driven violence and a lack of economic 
opportunities, is an important driver for migration (Van Hear et al., 2018). They have also drawn 
attention to migrants’ grassroots struggles and contestations of state-centred understandings of 
security and insecurity.
While the state has traditionally been the dominant referent object for declarations about secu-
rity, Buzan and Wæver (1997) have argued that society could also be considered a referent object; 
societal insecurity denotes the declaration of a threat to national identity rather than to state sover-
eignty. Indeed, dominant understandings of the migration-security nexus have presented migration 
as both a threat to state and societal security. When changing the referent object – for instance from 
the state to the migrant – the understanding of what security entails also changes. As Adamson 
argues, ‘human security and national security paradigms need not necessarily be diametrically 
opposed, [but] each does suggest a particular analytical lens through which one can assess the 
security impacts of international migration flows’ (2006: 167).
Securitization theory, as developed by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and other scholars associated 
with what has become known as the Copenhagen School, proposed that the invocation of ‘security’ 
through a speech act creates a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). This is a useful 
insight for interrogating the migration-security nexus, since ‘viewing security as discourse [..] 
denaturalises the real, suggesting that what is said about self and other needs to be understood as a 
historical unfolding and enfolding within a process of political struggle [and] allows us to explore 
new [. . .] relations between security and its related discourses’ (Sovacool and Halfon, 2007: 229). 
Since its original inception, a rich literature has further extended and refined securitization theory 
in ways that are important for the argument developed here. While early securitization theory pro-
posed that the effect of a securitizing speech act was to move the securitized issue out of normal 
politics into a space of exceptional measures, more recent work has broadened the understandings 
of securitizations as also encompassing practices that do not meet the threshold of exceptional poli-
tics (Stritzel, 2007). Moreover, following a sociological rather than philosophical model of secu-
ritization (Balzacq, 2010), Didier Bigo (2002) has gone beyond the focus on speech acts to draw 
attention to the significance of security practices for the securitization of migration. Perhaps most 
importantly, giving securitization ‘a stronger grounding in social theory’ has also brought focused 
attention to how securitizing actors vary in their positional power to influence collective meaning-
making (Stritzel, 2007: 373). Finally, this second-generation literature on securitization theory has 
brought attention to resistance to securitizing moves, which in some cases can be considered 
‘counter-securitization’ (Stritzel and Chang, 2015). By combining securitization through language 
with securitization through practice and focusing on how migration is framed as an everyday rather 
than exceptional (in)security threat, the framework developed here is firmly situated within sec-
ond-generation approaches to securitization. It also complements existing approaches, by interro-
gating the dynamic interplay between migration and security. It highlights that the logic of the 
migration-security nexus not only frames migration as affecting (in)security, but also charts how 
(in)security of various referent objects is seen to impact migration.
To chart the shifting and competing interpretations of the migration-security nexus, I work with 
three axes: a) the referent object – is the security of the sending country, the receiving country or 
the migrant at stake?; b) the driver – is (in)security conceived as affecting migration, or migration 
as impacting (in)security; and c) the nature of the relation between the two terms – for example, 
does more migration lead to security or insecurity (and vice versa)? For instance, the most promi-
nent combination is the securitization of migration (shaded grey in the table below), where migra-
tion is seen to cause insecurity for the receiving state (Referent: Receiving country; Driver: 
Migration; Relation: Insecurity).
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This framework charts the potential configurations of the migration-security nexus as it brings 
into view the kaleidoscope of potential connections and assumptions about the relation between 
‘migration’ and ‘security’. Among the examples (in italics), one can distinguish different types of 
security, such as human security, social security and national security that get tagged onto migra-
tion in the so-called migration-security nexus. Configurations of the nexus can also interact with 
one another: for instance, if migrants are considered a threat to state security, migrants’ own secu-
rity is more likely to be compromised by punitive measures (Wadia, 2015). This illustrates Buzan 
and Wæver’s argument against idealizing state security ‘as the sought for condition’ (1997: 246).
At the same time, the framework demonstrates that some configurations are radically incompati-
ble as they are based on conflicting assumptions. Each formation of the nexus has different political 
implications, since each discourse explicitly or implicitly contains a diagnostic frame providing a 
‘distinct description of the problem at stake and the threat involved’ and a prognostic frame which 
offers a solution to the identified problem (von Lucke et al., 2014: 863–864). If migration is seen to 
compromise the security of the receiving state, this implies a different political solution than if the 
focus is on the insecurity of the migrant as a result of the bordering practices of the receiving state.
The proposed framework can be used to analyse juxtaposing representations of empirical cases. 
For instance, recognizing the shifting meanings of the migration-security nexus, Christopher 
Browning refers to Trump’s border wall to halt Mexican migration and the image of drowned 
Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi on the Turkish shore as ‘two contrasting and polarized images of the 
nexus’ (2017: 39). Where the first constitutes a classical example of migration being considered a 
driver for the insecurity of the nation-state, with the walled border offering state security, the sec-
ond example turns this around, underlining not only how insecurity (war) drives migration, but 
also how migration in turn produces insecurity for migrants. While Browning is right that the 
dominant associations attached to Alan Kurdi and the Mexican border wall may be contrasting, this 
Table 1. An analytical framework for the migration-security nexus.
Configurations of the migration-security nexus
Referent:
Sending country
Driver: (In)security of the sending 
country as driver for migration
Driver: Migration as a driver for (in)
security in the sending country
Relation:
Security -> migration
e.g. return of refugees
Relation:
Insecurity -> 












Driver: (In)security of receiving country 
as driver for migration
Driver: Migration as a driver for (in)
security in the receiving country
Relation:



















Driver: (In)security of the migrant as 
driver for migration








e.g. fleeing from 











e.g. loss of social 
status; threat of 
deportation
de Jong 5
framework alerts us to the multiple and simultaneous configurations of the migration-security 
nexus. For instance, Alan Kurdi was also notoriously depicted in a 2016 cartoon in the French 
magazine Charlie Hebdo as a grown-up man, who sexually harasses women in Germany. This 
representation of Kurdi as racialized migrant man forming a security threat to host country’s white 
women aligns with Trump’s justification of border walls through reference to Mexican rapists 
threatening the United States.
In the next sections I will therefore focus on the empirical case of the protection of LECs, to 
illustrate how competing configurations of the migration-security nexus can get attached to a sin-
gle case, with profound political implications.
The protection of Iraqi and Afghan former locally employed civilians
The doctrinal focus in Afghanistan and Iraq on ‘winning hearts and minds’ for successful coun-
ter-insurgency operations made the role of linguistic and cultural mediators particularly perti-
nent. With insufficient linguistic skills present in Western militaries (Collin, 2009) and based on 
cost considerations (Bos and Soeters, 2006), a significant number of interpreters were recruited 
locally, either directly by states or through private contractors. Since LECs were often employed 
for years, in contrast to the international military who rotated on a yearly or six-monthly basis, 
they were also essential in providing institutional knowledge in a volatile environment. Despite 
extensive media interest in LECs and research in translation studies and anthropology about 
interpreters in conflict (Campbell, 2016; Collin, 2009; Footitt and Kelly, 2012; Inghilleri, 2010; 
Rafael, 2007; Rosendo and Muñoz, 2017), international relations scholarship has paid surpris-
ingly scant interest to LECs as security actors or as migrants seeking protection (for an excep-
tion, see Baker, 2010: on locally recruited interpreters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Baker, 2014; 
Kristensen, 2019).
Insurgents specifically target LECs and their families for their role in aiding foreign forces. 
In Afghanistan, for instance, where the Taliban has engaged in counter-securitization moves 
through night letters (shabnamah), presenting ‘“foreign sympathizers” as an existential threat’ to 
Afghan values and security (Stritzel and Chang, 2015: 556), LECs are considered traitors and 
‘tongues of the infidel’. There was no overarching international protection scheme and the 
implementation of national schemes has been found wanting (De Jong, 2021). In the UK, for 
instance, the resettlement scheme for Iraqi LECs was conceived after law firm Leigh Day threat-
ened a public litigation case, while in the United States the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) scheme 
was set up after extensive lobbying led by former USAID worker Kirk Johnson (Johnson, 2013). 
Under this scheme, a set number of SIVs are reserved annually for Iraqi and Afghan interpreters 
working for the US military (since 2006), and two other programmes authorize SIVs for Iraqi 
and Afghan nationals who have worked for, or on behalf of, the US government in Iraq (estab-
lished in 2008) and Afghanistan (established in 2009). In September 2019, a federal judge ruled 
that the visa delays faced by SIV applicants were ‘unreasonable and unlawful’ and ordered the 
government to expedite the processing of pending applications (International Refugee Assistance 
Project, 2019). However, when in April 2021 the United States announced the upcoming with-
drawal of troops from Afghanistan, more than 18,000 applicants were still in Afghanistan, lead-
ing advocates to call for an urgent evacuation to a safe location for visa processing (Washington 
Post Live, 2021).
In the UK, the Ministry of Defence announced in April 2021 a new Afghan Relocation and 
Assistance Policy (ARAP) with an anticipated uptake of about 850 LECs. This replaced the 
previous Intimidation Scheme, which had been characterized in a Parliamentary Defence Select 
Committee Report as ‘hitherto useless’ (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2018). Thus 
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far, fewer than 500 LECs had been relocated under the Redundancy (Ex-Gratia scheme), which 
restricted eligibility to LECs who were made redundant or resigned after serving at least a year 
on Helmand’s front line, a fraction of the total number of 7,000 LECs employed (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2018). The French resettlement scheme initially only accepted 
73 LECs, and when it was reopened after pressure from lawyers, it accepted another 103. It still 
rejected a further 150 cases without providing a justification (Decroix and Baouz, 2015; Tallès, 
2019), including multiple applications by Abdul Basir, a former LEC employed by the French 
army, who was assassinated in June 2021 (AFP, 2021). Some LECs who found themselves ineli-
gible under the stringent criteria of the national resettlement programmes or who faced long 
waiting times, fled in the hope of claiming asylum, with several getting stranded in third coun-
tries, as the Dublin III Regulation stipulates that one must claim asylum in the first safe country 
(El-Enany, 2013). With some states refusing to take responsibility for LECs who worked for 
other nations, many were left in limbo.
The data that forms the basis for this article has been collected in the context of a research pro-
ject that investigates the demands for protection by LECs and their advocates. The main source for 
the analysis offered here are 32 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2017 and 2020 with 
male Afghan and Iraqi interpreters who now live in the USA, UK, Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Some interpreters had worked for several different national armies (for 
instance, the US and French forces or US and Canadian armies) and some had claimed asylum in 
third countries (e.g. former interpreters for the US army living in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany). In the same period, I also interviewed 36 advocates and service providers in the afore-
mentioned countries, including veterans, lawyers, representatives of professional interpreting asso-
ciations and refugee resettlement caseworkers. Additionally, I conducted document analysis of 
(social) media, policy reports and court cases, and carried out (participant) observations of national 
and international political meetings.
The next sections will chart the configurations of the migration-security nexus as they apply to 
the discourses and practices surrounding the protection of Iraqi and Afghan LECs. I will work 
through the framework in a structured way by discussing in turn the configurations linked to each 
of the three referent objects: firstly, the sending country; secondly, the receiving country; and 
thirdly, migrants themselves. I will make visible the impacts of considering either migration or (in)
security as the driver of the relation, and what changes when the migration-security nexus is 
invoked to imply either a relation between migration and security or insecurity.
Charting the configurations of the migration-security nexus
Referent sending country: The migration-(in)security nexus
A kaleidoscope of configurations of the migration-security nexus can be identified when the refer-
ent object, i.e. who is secured, is the sending country. Firstly, in some cases (the promise of) secu-
rity is presented as a driver for return migration and, secondly, insecurity is presented as driving 
emigration. The stories of some Afghan LECs whom I interviewed started with their return migra-
tion from Pakistan back to Afghanistan. I define return migrants here broadly as ‘migrants who 
travel back to their country of birth to live there, regardless of the circumstances and motivation to 
do so and regardless of length of stay’, following Van Houte, Siegel and Davids’ critique that the 
bureaucratic differentiation of dichotomies of voluntary and involuntary return does not capture 
the complex realities (2016: 3). Some of these returning migrants had been part of the earlier wave 
of emigration from Afghanistan to Pakistan in the 1990s. Now young adults, they were lured back 
by the promise of a different, safer Afghanistan and were part of the ‘unprecedented wave of 
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returns’ of around 3.5 million Afghan refugees (of whom more than 3 million are estimated to have 
received UNHCR’s assistance) following the 2001 Western military intervention and the establish-
ment of a new government (Monsutti, 2007: 168).
Return migration also served a political function as it ‘is often viewed by the International com-
munity as a signifier of peace and stability in origin countries, and in the case of Afghanistan thus 
a demonstration that US and NATO tactics are succeeding’ (Koser, 2011: 134). The young men did 
not necessarily consider their return a confirmation that Afghanistan was now safe, but rather con-
sidered it their duty to rebuild the nation. As one LEC who currently lives in the United States 
explained to me,
We were 100 students who came from Pakistan and we had one call, we were going to help our country. 
[. . .] Our grandfathers and fathers had been helping the country as soldiers, so what the hell are we doing? 
We used to be ashamed and embarrassed that we should let American or UK soldiers come and take care 
of us, but as Afghans we should sit at home and let them do whatever they want. (Interview 1)
However, enduring insecurity of the Afghan state has also led to mass emigration. This foregrounds 
another configuration of the migration-security nexus: not the promise of security, but rather inse-
curity driving migration. Return migration happened alongside ‘one of the world’s largest and most 
enduring protracted refugee situations’ (Koser, 2011: 131). Those I interviewed who had returned 
to Afghanistan post-2001 and who undertook employment with Western military forces emigrated 
again after a few years, when their association with Western forces became a security risk. Whether 
Afghanistan is a sovereign state that can protect its own citizens, or an insecure state whose citizens 
require international protection is a deeply contested issue. The declaration by many European 
countries that Afghanistan is safe has justified their deportations and rejections of asylum claims, 
demonstrating the political impact of such speech acts.
A 2017 Amnesty International report quotes a leaked EU document, in which ‘EU agencies 
acknowledged Afghanistan’s “worsening security situation and threats to which people are 
exposed”, as well as the likelihood that “record levels of terrorist attacks and civilian casualties” 
will increase, but nevertheless stated that “more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be 
returned in the near future”’ (2017: 35). Amnesty International hence argued that ‘to effect [. . .] 
returns, European countries have arbitrarily called some areas of Afghanistan “safe”’ (2017: 41). 
As a UK immigration solicitor explained to me, ‘in 2015 we spent a good year challenging the 
country guidance 2012 [which forms the basis for asylum decisions], saying it needs to be revisited 
and that most of the [. . .] the evidence we have shows that it’s unsafe and that you can’t just relo-
cate to Kabul’ (Interview 2). An Afghan former interpreter, who had lived for four years as an 
unaccompanied minor in the UK and who took up a job as an interpreter after he was deported to 
Afghanistan, explained that
they know the reality in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not a safe country. They try to always say “if Nigrahar 
is not safe, go to Kabul”, [. . .] but to the person that says “Kabul is safe”, I will tell him “go there for a 
week, you will see for yourself”. (Interview 3)
The migration-security nexus reveals itself here as one in which anti-migration sentiments and the 
pressure to keep refugee numbers low encourages the declaration that states are secure. Once states 
are declared safe, this legitimizes the rejection of asylum claims. The contradicting claims about 
general (in)security in Afghanistan play out in specific ways in relation to the resettlement of 
LECs. Reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) have identified LECs among those with potential risk 
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profiles, since they face targeted threats from insurgents in addition to the indiscriminate violence 
endemic to conflict zones (European Asylum Support Office, 2019: 43; UNHCR, 2018). This dem-
onstrates that when (in)security gets connected to migration by means of claims to or denials of 
protection, there is a propensity to make reductionist claims about security. These do not only fail 
to capture complex realities on the ground, but also conceal the political contentions underlying 
proclamations about security.
One only has to scratch the surface before the contradictions become apparent. The UK 
Intimidation Scheme for former Afghan interpreters considered none of the threats described 
by a total of 570 applicants severe enough to categorize them as ‘red’ (highest level) and there-
fore warranting international relocation. Instead, they offered ‘bespoke security advice’ (to 
which I will return below) and internal relocation within Afghanistan (House of Lords, 25 
February 2020). Remarkably, the Intimidation Investigation Unit that assesses the claims 
operates from Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul and, as the MoD explained, the 
security situation in Afghanistan means that ‘investigating officers are unable to move outside 
of secure NATO bases to conduct investigations’ (quoted in House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2018: 18).
Claims about migration and security also revolve around the question of who is responsible for 
providing security, and hence by implication for the protection of the LECs who have been 
employed in the name of making Afghanistan and Iraq secure states. Are Iraq and Afghanistan 
failed states whose inability to guarantee the security of their citizens produces migrants, or is the 
insecurity of these states linked to the protracted Western interventions? Some LECs and their 
advocates, who tried to make sense of why many states were not very forthcoming with resettle-
ment, despite the relatively small number of former LECs and the broad public support they 
receive, suspected that providing LECs with protection would amount to conceding that the mis-
sion had failed. As a UK-based LEC explained,
if they do accept [that Afghanistan is still not safe], then citizens in the UK will question [the government]: 
“Ok, you have to spend that amount of money, 17 years, and our sons, our brothers, they have lost their 
lives, what was the achievement?” (Interview 4)
This is echoed by findings from Denmark, where Kristensen observed that ‘issuing asylum [to 
former interpreters supporting Danish forces] [. . .] would amount to accepting a Danish defeat in 
Afghanistan’ (2019: 80). In contrast, a report on the Afghan LEC relocation scheme by the UK 
House of Commons Defence Select Committee shifted responsibility to the Afghan government: 
‘We strongly suspect that the Afghan Government is reluctant to acknowledge that the country is 
too dangerous to guarantee the safety of local people who helped the NATO mission to combat the 
Taliban’ (2018: 21). It accused Afghanistan of a vested interest in denying the continued insecurity, 
which would threaten their existential claim to sovereignty and thus statehood (Buzan and Wæver, 
1997).
The above examples have presented two configurations of the nexus in which, respectively, 
security and insecurity of the sending state are the driver for migration: first, the promise of the 
renewed security of Afghanistan as a driver for return migration, and secondly, the insecurity of 
Afghanistan as driving emigration. However, the migration-security nexus with the sending 
country as the referent was completely reversed in other instances. Instead of (in)security driv-
ing migration, migration was considered the driver of (in)security for the migrants’ country of 
origin. This configuration, which links migration with the brain drain of those deemed most 
suitable to build a future secure state, again gives political salience to arguments against migra-
tion. However, in contrast to the earlier presented anti-migration arguments, in which Iraq and 
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Afghanistan are presented as states which can guarantee the security of their own citizens 
(thereby making international protection through migration redundant), in this configuration 
Iraq and Afghanistan suddenly appear as states whose future security depends on preventing an 
exodus of highly skilled migrants.
A good example is a report by the United States non-profit organization Hollings Center for 
International Dialogue, which states that Afghan civil society leaders feared that the SIV pro-
gramme ‘contributed to the shrinking of the educated middle class, [who are] considered some of 
the most effective advocates of democracy and human rights in Afghanistan [making the country] 
more vulnerable to traditional and radical religious forces’ (Coburn and Sharan, 2016: 11). It quotes 
an Afghan informant claiming that ‘the SIV has reinforced uncertainty . . . a mixed feeling that the 
country is not moving in the right direction, that the country is not safe and that the US is taking its 
people, the best and brightest’ (Coburn and Sharan, 2016: 7). This configuration of the migration-
security nexus is once again not without its contestations. The UK House of Commons Defence 
Committee’s report, for instance, condemned the UK government for instrumentalizing brain drain 
arguments: ‘This is completely disingenuous. If the “brightest and the best” have to go into hiding, 
their brains will hardly be available for the advancement of Afghan national development’ (House 
of Commons Defence Committee, 2018).
This section has mapped competing claims about the security and insecurity of Afghanistan and 
Iraq in relation to migration, and demonstrates that (in)security is invoked as a driver of migration, 
but conversely migration also appears as a driver for the insecurity of the sending state. The next 
section will continue to chart the configurations of the migration-security nexus and its political 
ramifications, focusing on receiving countries as the referent object.
Referent receiving country: The migration-(in)security nexus
In the wake of 9/11, associations between migration and Islamic terrorism gained new currency (Faist, 
2004). In the claim about migration producing insecurity for Western host countries, ironically, those 
presented as the ‘best and brightest’ in the brain drain argument now figure as potential terrorists. The 
military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were framed around combatting Islamic terrorism. Western 
states’ reluctance to accept male Muslim refugees in general hence also needs to be understood in the 
context of this vilification of the figure of the (predominantly male) barbaric Islamic terrorist.
A US Marine Corps veteran, who now works for a non-profit human rights organization and 
campaigns for the protection of former LECs, told me that ‘we have some politicians who cyni-
cally have seen an advantage in creating a bogeyman, painting people from the Middle East in this 
broad brush of potential terrorist’ (Interview 5). While he personally disagrees with the association 
between Muslim migrants and security risks, he told me that he uses a pragmatic strategy in his 
lobbying work rather than the principled approach commonly adopted by migrant and human 
rights organizations. Strategically, he told me, in a campaign you present ‘a retired general [. . .] to 
say “they [SIV holders] are the most thoroughly vetted of any category of traveler”’ (Interview 5). 
His argument does not challenge the link made between migration and potential insecurity for the 
host country, but carves out an exceptional position for former LECs as a category of migrants who 
are ‘security-cleared’. His strategy can be understood alongside Stritzel’s observation that ‘the bet-
ter the compatibility of the articulated text [. . .] and the existing discourse [. . .] and the better the 
positional power of securitizing actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred indi-
vidual text as a dominant narrative’ (2007: 370).
In instances which exempt LECs from negative migration discourses or policies, the overall 
logic of the migration-security nexus in which migrants are presented as threats to the security of 
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Western host nations remains intact. Soon after Trump announced Executive Order 13769, 
‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, known colloquially as 
the ‘Muslim ban’, following political pressure, he exempted Iraqi SIV holders (Scribner, 2017). As 
The New York Times reported, ‘Mr. Trump said when he issued the executive order that it was 
intended to allow American officials to vet Iraqis and others more thoroughly. But the interpreters 
had extensive security vetting before they were permitted to accompany American forces. They 
spent years clearing more background security checks while applying for the special visas’ 
(Zucchino, 2017). Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’ is a classic instance of a securitization process in which 
migration and mobility were moved to the realm of exceptional politics, justifying security meas-
ures that restrict freedoms (Newman, 2010).
The configuration of the migration-security nexus in which migration is considered the driver 
of insecurity for the host country has particular currency in the global North. As noted by Collyer, 
‘migration is not universally considered as a security risk, but most frequently associated with ter-
rorism in wealthier parts of the world. [. . .] This distinction can be explained by the dominant 
European vision of surrounding areas as innately insecure, in contrast to the safety of Europe’ 
(2006: 256). This demarcation between the ‘unsafe East’ and the ‘secure West’ explains the para-
doxical situation in which LECs have the role of security actor in war zones, but are subsequently 
considered potential security threats when they become migrants to Western nations. This was the 
case with one Afghan LEC who had found employment with the British army as an interpreter after 
he was deported from the UK. While the British army considered his previous deportation no 
obstacle to employing him in Afghanistan – and likely his English fluency built during his young 
years in England was considered a major asset – his deportation was held against him when he 
reapplied for asylum in the UK based on the threats he faced.
It is also illustrated by the case of an Afghan interpreter whose SIV application was rejected by 
the State Department because ‘he “may be a terrorist or may have provided material support to a 
terrorist organization”’. Intriguingly, the same Afghan interpreter continued to be employed by the 
US military. The Washington Post quotes him wondering: ‘My question is, if I am involved in ter-
rorist activities, why am I still working for the US Army?’ (Sieff, 2013). Another former interpreter 
for the British army also highlighted this contradiction to me. Listening to him helps to recognize 
that ‘the subjects of securitization in this case are agency-rich political actors within the political 
unit seeking to securitize them’ (Glover, 2011: 92–93). He recounted that he told the UK Minister 
of Defence, whom he once had the occasion to meet, that
before an interpreter is hired, there is a procedure [. . .] that we go through – a screening test. That screening 
test clears an interpreter that he is good to go, which means that he is safe, you can rely on him, you can 
trust your life on him and he is the safest and closest friend you’ve got in the country. Now how come that 
the same interpreter who has been with you on the front line was safe, would not be safe when he is here 
[in the UK]? (Interview 6)
I have presented here how migration is framed as driving traditional security threats to the receiv-
ing state and the contestations in response to this. As securitization scholars have shown, migration 
is also presented as posing non-traditional security threats to the ‘cultural identity and social stabil-
ity’ of the host nation (Sørensen, 2012: 66). This alleged symbolic threat by migrants has also been 
described in terms of ‘societal security’, which ‘can be threatened by whatever puts its “we” iden-
tity into jeopardy’ (Buzan quoted in Collyer, 2006: 259; see also Buzan and Wæver, 1997). 
Changing from physical to societal security brings into view a new configuration of the migration-
security nexus, in which LECs occupy an intriguing position. For instance, in a statement by Major 
Driscoll, the initiator of a 2015 Change.org petition, addressed to the then UK prime minister, 
LECs are singled out as exceptional for their contribution to societal security and therefore as 
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deserving of protection: ‘It is my belief that any man, who is courageous enough to fight alongside 
the British Army in the defence of our British values and standards, when threatened, is entitled to 
live under the protection of this country’ (Driscoll, 2015).
While the migration-security nexus can form the basis for refugee protection when it is recog-
nized that the insecurity of the country of origin or of the migrant drives migration, asylum claims 
are jeopardized when the opposite configuration takes precedence and asylum claims are assessed 
on the basis of the anticipated impact of the migrant on host state or societal security. This reversal 
became obvious when a French activist lawyer shared with me (Interview 7) examples of assess-
ments written by French soldiers stationed in Afghanistan, which were included in the case files of 
LECs’ rejected resettlement applications. One of the questions on the assessment form concerns 
the ‘expected ability to integrate into the French nation’. One soldier replied to this question: ‘As 
a practising Muslim, he has a rather religious vision of life and society, which is not very compat-
ible with an integration project in France’ (Task Force La Fayette VI – translation by the author). 
As Didier Bigo argues, ‘the political game in each country delineates the figure of the migrant by 
inverting the image of the good citizen. In France, laicity and centralization create the migrant 
image as that of a religious fanatic – a member of a community committed to destroying the prin-
ciples of republicanism’ (2002: 70).
In a similar vein, Thomas Faist has noted that ‘after 9/11 postmodern ambiguities [. . .] have 
been replaced by a clear trench line between liberalism vs. terrorism’ (2004: 11). Hence for a 
(Muslim) migrant not to be considered a security threat to the receiving state or society, they should 
not only pass security screenings, but also espouse the presumed liberal values of Western states. 
Allegiance to Western liberal values is often evaluated by reference to views on gender and sexual-
ity, against the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan also being justified in the name of saving 
women (Shepherd, 2006). This is illustrated by the statement of a German reservist soldier, who is 
a voluntary mentor for Mohammed, an Afghan former employee of the Swedish and German 
NATO forces, whom he describes as follows:
Mohammed is very open, much more than I expected maybe. This is due maybe to his family background 
and maybe due to his education and to the fact that he has been in contact with people from Western 
countries for a very long time. [. . .] He met my [male] partner very soon after we got together [as mentor-
mentee]. (Interview 8)
While he does not explicitly link homophobia to Islam, this assumption forms the backdrop of his 
description of Mohammed as more ‘open’ than he expected. Indeed to ‘embody the dominant iden-
tity and concomitant set of values’ is considered by some LECs and their advocates to be the ‘only 
strategy to garner success in fighting the most recent wave of securitized discourse around migra-
tion’ (Glover, 2011: 90). Mohammed’s response to his mentor serves to reinforce his position as 
non-threatening migrant: ‘For me, [their gay relationship is] totally OK, although I am a Muslim; 
I am not an extremist Muslim, I am not praying usually’ (Interview 9). Arguably, this strategy 
leaves intact the dominant national identity to be secured and only exempts model migrants who 
adopt an assimilationist approach. Other LECs I interviewed considered this an ‘unacceptable and 
unjust instruction upon their previously held identities and belief-systems’ (Glover, 2011: 90), and 
for instance resisted Western resettlement workers’ ‘civilizing’ efforts to reorganize gender roles 
within their families.
The above examples have shown what the migration-security nexus can look like when migra-
tion is negatively linked to security, being considered a traditional or non-traditional threat to the 
host nation. I will stay with the host country as referent object, and chart the alternative configura-
tion in which the relation between migration and security is suddenly viewed positively, ‘since 
migration may itself be viewed as being a benefit to security as much as a threat to it’ (Browning, 
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2017: 48–49). For instance, in a statement about the amendment of the travel ban, a United States 
Embassy official in Baghdad claimed that ‘the US government has determined that it is in the 
national interest to allow Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders to continue to travel to the 
United States’ (Zucchino, 2017: emphasis added). In a full-page newspaper advert1, a collective of 
advocates, including a Dutch refugee NGO, trade unions, the Dutch branch of Amnesty International 
and the International Association of Conference Interpreters, appealed to the Dutch Minister of 
Defence to accept the asylum claim of a former Afghan local interpreter for the US army, remind-
ing her that ‘while risking his own life, he committed himself to our peace and security’ (18 
October 2019, Telegraaf; emphasis added). In this configuration, LECs’ migration is framed as 
explicitly contributing to the security of host countries.
Bigo has observed that the meaning of security has expanded in recent years, which ‘effectively 
results in a convergence between the meaning of international and internal security’ (2002: 63). If 
this insight is taken seriously, this in turn affects the way security is framed as interacting with 
migration in the nexus. Here LECs are considered not only as contributing to the safety of Western 
nations during conflict; also, as migrants they are recognized as contributing to the security of host 
nations. This reasoning takes at least two forms. First, welcoming former LECs as migrants signals 
the reliability of Western nations to prospective LECs and hence furthers the future security of 
Western armies. As General David Petraeus, former commander of the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, stated: ‘if others around the world see that we don’t live up to our 
obligations to these individuals [. . .] then we’re going to find it very hard to recruit that kind of 
assistance in other situations’ (Washington Post Live, 2021). Secondly, LECs can symbolically 
protect the nation as model migrants, Westernized and liberal, and proud patriots of the adopted 
nation, as expressed in the many media stories documenting resettled LECs’ eagerness to natural-
ize and enlist in the army and police force (DuVernay, 2018).
Referent migrants: The migration-(in)security nexus
The first two sections have charted the multiple configurations of the nexus following a traditional 
approach that foregrounds (sending and receiving) nation-states as the referent objects. The con-
cept of human security shifts attention to the individual as the main referent and beneficiary of 
security politics. One way in which policymakers have worked with this configuration of the 
migration-security nexus is by promoting interventions that address the insecurity of aspiring 
migrants inside their countries of origin to prevent migration. Potential migrant host countries seek 
to ameliorate the human security of aspiring migrants, for instance through development aid, tap-
ping into the links with the other rising policy frames of the security-development nexus and the 
migration-development nexus (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008).
This provides the context for the UK’s ex-gratia (redundancy) scheme for local interpreters, 
which treats the matter largely as an issue of (loss of) job security. Two of the three options offered 
under the scheme (a redundancy payment and training and education) ‘must be undertaken in 
Afghanistan’. Despite this, the refusal letter of admission to Britain to a former LEC who applied 
for relocation under the ex-gratia scheme nevertheless reverts back to the earlier configuration of 
the migration-security nexus in which the prospective migrant is considered a threat to the receiv-
ing nation: ‘There are serious reasons for considering that you constitute a danger to the commu-
nity or to the security of the United Kingdom’ (Notice of Immigration Decision: Refusal of 
Entrance Clearance 2017 obtained through private communication with a former LEC).
Simultaneously, the refusal letter expresses concern with the insecurity of the applicant, as it 
also contains an attached ‘Security brief’ to ‘assist in keeping yourself and family safe’, now that 
his quest to find protection through migration to Britain has been denied. In this brief, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office offers two and a half pages of advice under the heading ‘Think Safety 
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First’. It includes the recommendations to ‘not wear expensive or “loud” clothes’, ‘not have west-
ern names or job titles on [your phone] that link you to your job – create codenames instead – for 
example, instead of “Bill” stored on your phone have “Ali”’ and ‘discreetly check for IEDs (car 
bombs) before driving away’ (2017 security advice obtained through private communication with 
a former LEC). Here the responsibility for security is delegated from the state (either Afghanistan 
or Britain) to the individual. Studying these configurations of the migration-security nexus side by 
side shows that ‘human security approaches [. . .] shift attention beyond the state, but do not go far 
enough in considering how framing migration in terms of two conflicting security claims – human 
versus national security – produces particular effects’ (Huysmans and Squire, 2010: 172). These 
particular effects will become visible in the subsequent examples.
As Newman summarizes, ‘in broad terms human security is “freedom from want” and “freedom 
from fear”’ (2010: 78). As the experiences of some LECs highlight, migration can offer security for 
those fleeing from conflict, producing a configuration of the migration-security nexus in which 
migration drives human security and the two terms are positively associated. Migration can, how-
ever, also be negatively linked, ‘lead[ing] to human insecurity’ (Vietti and Scribner, 2013: 22) with 
state security measures often restricting legal escape routes for migrants, leaving migrants vulner-
able to ‘abuses [. . .] in transit’ (Vietti and Scribner, 2013: 26). For instance, UK newspapers 
reported the story of one former Afghan interpreter trapped in the notorious Moria refugee camp 
on Lesvos, Greece (Williams and Brown, 2020). The insecurity of a former LEC whom I met in the 
UK continued beyond his transit when his asylum claim was rejected and he found himself home-
less, while another LEC whom I met in Belgium returned to Afghanistan after failing to obtain 
secure legal status. At least one former Afghan interpreter took his own life after time in UK immi-
gration detention and facing deportation (Bonnici, 2016). Since detention and deportation are 
measures introduced ‘in the name of securitizing states’ (Wadia, 2015: 92), these examples demon-
strate the effects of framing national security paradigms and human security paradigms as conflict-
ing and basing (anti-)migration policy on this logic. Hence, as Huysmans and Squire (2010) 
suggest, analysis of the migration-security nexus raises broader critical questions around the pro-
duction of the political legitimacy of forms of violence against migrants.
The analytical framework of the nexus makes visible how people move from one to another 
configuration: insecurity can drive their migration, but migration subsequently generates insecuri-
ties for migrants in the host country. Many resettled former LECs struggle with insecure (tempo-
rary) legal status, un- and under-employment, family separation and lack of access to psychological 
care. Also, one configuration can lead to another, with ‘the upshot of treating migration as a secu-
rity threat [being] the increased insecurity amongst migrant [. . .] populations in the West, and 
particularly among those from Muslim majority countries’ (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015: 2). Indeed, 
many resettled LECs reported racist abuse in the host countries. In addition to ‘insecurities engen-
dered by restrictive migration control practices’, there are ‘those created as a result of poor integra-
tion/inclusionary politics’ (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015: 3). One Iraqi LEC explained to me how he 
weighed two types of insecurity and risk against one another before his migration: the physical 
insecurity he experienced in Iraq versus the social insecurity in the United States:
The trade-off here is, I was making good money in Iraq, I was in a very high position [. . .]. On the other 
hand, in one moment, you can lose everything. I’d leave my home every day with the fear of never coming 
back to the kids, [. . .] so between this and that, I chose to come here and take a risk. To me it’s a new life, 
a new challenge. I would say I’m lucky to get a job, and to be able to integrate into society and to make a 
good living compared to others [less] fortunate than I am. (Interview 10)
When analysing configurations of the migration-security nexus that foreground the migrant as 
referent, it is important to be attentive to migrants’ own definitions of (in)security, while at the 
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same time recognizing that ‘their positional power’ as a securitizing actor is limited (Stritzel, 
2007: 370). As Innes argues, ‘the migrant agent theorizes security in the performance of seeking 
it’ (2014: 571). One of my informants, for instance, went underground when he faced deporta-
tion after his asylum claim in Norway was refused and eventually made his way to Germany to 
seek protection. He had worked as a translator for US forces and was involved in the translation 
of new law decrees sent to every court in Afghanistan. In the Norwegian court papers, summariz-
ing the negative decision on his case, his testimony about the security threats is questioned: 
‘Afghanistan is not a society of documents, and half the population are illiterate. The signifi-
cance of [the applicant]’s name being on the nine decrees, [. . .] must be valued on this basis.’ 
His question ‘Do you expect me to carry my dead body, and say, “I need protection”?’ raises the 
issue of who is entrusted with defining (in)security in the different configurations of the secu-
rity-migration nexus (Interview 11).
In contrast to the earlier-mentioned system of assessment of intimidation claims made by 
Afghan LECs, done remotely by the UK Intimidation Investigation Unit from Hamid Karzai 
International Airport in Kabul, former Iraqi LEC ‘were entitled to relocate to the United Kingdom 
if they considered themselves to be in danger’, because ‘conditions on the ground in Iraq made it 
nigh on impossible to assess or verify claims of alleged intimidation’ (UK court case Hottak & 
Another, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs & Another [2016] EWCA Civ 438 – italics added).
LECs who flee the country through asylum routes refuse to accept that they do not meet state-
sanctioned criteria and follow their own assessment of (in)security. Consequently, if migration fails 
to offer them the security that they set out to find, because the host state’s ‘immigration procedures 
[. . .] do not coincide with [their] subjective determination of [their] own security’, they may 
‘see[k] an alternative security’ (Innes, 2014: 571). My informant, for instance, managed to obtain 
church sanctuary when again faced with deportation, and successfully mobilized his political, reli-
gious, military and academic advocacy contacts to challenge his deportation back to Norway, even-
tually obtaining temporary protection in Germany. Such alternative security should not be 
romanticized, since it is ‘tenuous’ and does not gain full autonomy from state definitions of secu-
rity as it is constructed in response to state measures (Innes, 2014: 574). However, it shows that 
‘the state does not have the final word on security’ (Innes, 2014: 574) and hence such counter-
hegemonic securities need to be recognized when identifying the kaleidoscope of configurations of 
the migration-security nexus.
Conclusion
The ascendancy of the specific configuration of the migration-security nexus that links migration 
with security threats to host nations and legitimizes bordering practices has been well documented. 
However, this focus on one dominant configuration of the nexus has neglected the variety of con-
figurations that the migration-security nexus invokes in discourse, practice and analysis. In this 
article, I have proposed an analytical framework that allows a more comprehensive engagement 
with the range of associations that the security-migration nexus invokes, and have illustrated the 
use of this framework with the under-researched case of Afghan and Iraqi former LECs seeking 
protection through migration. The framework categorizes the various forms of the nexus through 
three axes and their combinations, which emerge in the struggles over the meaning of security and 
its relation to migration: 1) the referent object; 2) the primary driver or the affected phenomenon; 
and 3) the relation established between the terms.
Mapping and interrogating the ways in which migration and security get linked has both analyti-
cal and normative value. Applying the framework to other empirical cases, such as refugee 
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rescuers, also framed as ‘people smugglers’, or the practices and discourses associated with the 
‘refugee crisis’ (also considered ‘solidarity crisis’ (De Jong and Ataç, 2017: 28) will help reveal 
which configurations have political salience and which configurations evoke marginalized coun-
ter-discourses and practices by actors lacking positional power. With the framework, I have laid 
bare contradictions within the kaleidoscope of configurations, as a result of opportunistic policy 
framing, or struggles over meaning between different actors, such as the same LECs being consid-
ered security actors in the East and security threats in the West, or the ‘best and brightest’ causing 
both brain drain and being potential terrorists. The framework and the analysis of the protection of 
LECs have sought to capture some of the insights offered by second-generation literature on secu-
ritization theory, highlighting securitizing practices, positional power and resistance; however, fur-
ther work is needed to fully integrate the typologies developed in this body of literature (e.g. 
Stritzel and Chang, 2015: 553) into the framework proposed here, charting the configurations of 
the migration-security nexus.
Uncovering the nexus’s multiple configurations, contradictions and tensions supports the schol-
arly and political project of denaturalizing the migration-security nexus, and hence of the desecu-
ritization of migration. Reiterating the words of the Afghan LEC who asked ‘Do you expect me to 
carry my dead body, and say, “I need protection”?’, denaturalizing the nexus is needed to challenge 
the perversity of security practices which force people seeking refuge to risk their lives in order to 
save their lives.
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Note
1. The title of the newspaper advertisement was ‘Minister Bijleveld, u laat deze oorlogshelden toch niet in 
de steek?’ [‘Minister Bijleveld, you won’t abandon these war heroes, right?’]. See Nederlandse Omroep 
Stichting (NOS) (2019) for an image of the advertisement.
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